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Africa has experienced an un-precedented level of involve-ment in its regional affairs by Middle Eastern states in the 
past few years.1 This is a remarkable de-
velopment, indeed, given that transregional 
relations have been characterized by recip-
rocal ignorance for most of the post-World 
War II period.
The scope of these current transregional 
entanglements can be best observed along 
the African coast bordering the Red Sea. 
Middle Eastern states have facilitated 
peace talks in, for instance, Sudan (Qatar, 
2008-2011), and Somalia (Saudi Arabia, 
2007; Turkey, since 2011), as well as 
between Djibouti and Eritrea (Qatar, 2010-
2017).2 More recently, concerted mediation 
efforts by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
and Saudi Arabia have led to an agreement 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia — ending, 
finally, their 20-year war in September 
2018 — and stimulated fresh negotiations 
between Djibouti and Eritrea. New talks 
have also been facilitated regarding the 
three-way conflict among Egypt, Ethiopia 
and Sudan over sharing the Nile waters.3
However, recent Middle Eastern spats 
have also left the Horn of Africa facing se-
curity-related repercussions. The intra-Gulf 
crisis pitting Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
against Qatar and Turkey has reverberated 
to such an extent that the African Union 
discussed the spillover in January 2018.4 
And while the recent diplomatic break-
through between Eritrea and Ethiopia has 
been widely praised as an important step 
toward regional stabilization, observers 
also caution that Middle Eastern geopoliti-
cal rivalries could “provoke destabilizing 
reactions across the Horn of Africa.”5
This is even more true as the Red Sea 
has experienced notable militarization 
of late.6 Besides the permanent members 
of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), which have already established 
military bases in the region or are plan-
ning to do so, Middle Eastern states are 
also emerging as regional military players. 
Egypt, Iran, Israel and Qatar obviously 
have a stake in these developments, while 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE, which 
seem bent on becoming key actors in the 
Greater Horn, are constructing a series of 
military bases from Sudan to Somalia.
The debates about the militarization 
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of the Red Sea obscure, however, the 
fact that Africa as a whole has become a 
region of vital interest to these and other 
Middle Eastern states, each of them with 
its own history of relations there. While 
prospective economic benefits and inter-
national prestige have long dominated the 
agenda, present-day dynamics are heavily 
driven by the struggle for hegemony in the 
Middle East.
This article focuses on the policies of 
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the domi-
nant regional powers at the center of the 
hegemonic competition.7 On the one hand, 
their turn to Africa indicates that their 
foreign policies have become more asser-
tive on the international stage, especially 
regarding South-South relations. On the 
other, their current strategic approaches 
and their politics of alliance building 
follow very closely the logic of conflict 
dynamics in their home region. 
EVOLUTION OF RELATIONS
Although Ankara, Riyadh and Tehran 
stress the historic and cultural depth of 
their centuries-old relations with Africa, 
the forging of diplomatic ties with post-
colonial African states is a relatively new 
phenomenon.
Post-revolutionary Iran 
Iran first reached out to the continent’s 
decolonizing states in the 1950s. Under 
Pahlavi rule, its Africa policy mainly 
sought to contain communism by support-
ing the economies of “moderate” states 
such as Ethiopia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan 
and Zaire. By 1976, on the eve of the Is-
lamic Revolution, it had established bilat-
eral relations with 31 African states.8 The 
emergence of the Islamic Republic altered 
the approach to these states, increasing 
their importance to Tehran in many ways.
After the revolution in 1979, Iran was 
diplomatically isolated across large parts 
of the globe, including the Middle East.9 
Africa provided an opportunity to political-
ly and economically break this isolation. 
With international sanctions imposed on 
Tehran, the continent gained in importance 
as a market for exports, particularly crude 
oil, and provided access to raw materials. 
Poverty in large parts of the African conti-
nent, in turn, opened the door to Iranian in-
fluence in many states — especially in the 
Sahel — despite Tehran’s limited means.10 
Besides direct military and financial aid, 
development assistance distributed via 
Construction Jihad (Jahad-e Sazandegi), 
an organization  created in the wake of the 
revolution and later merged with the Min-
istry of Agriculture, was a major tool for 
gaining a foothold.11 Another was mission-
ary activities, often conducted via Iranian-
financed cultural centers or schools, both 
in countries with significant Shiite minori-
ties such as Ghana and Nigeria, as well as 
those with Sunni majorities like Mali or 
Senegal.12
Altogether, the Islamic Republic’s in-
volvement in Africa has fluctuated in scope 
and intensity over time, depending on the 
international pressure on Tehran as well as 
the foreign-policy orientation of its lead-
ership.13 It was strongest under President 
Ahmadinejad (2005–13), when, due to the 
conflict over its nuclear program, Tehran 
was in need of international partners. It 
sought them in the Côte d’Ivoire, Lesotho, 
Mauritania, Namibia and South Africa — 
a nonpermanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council from 2007 to 
2008.14 States with notable uranium depos-
its, like Malawi, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo 
and Uganda, became focal points under 
Ahmadinejad’s tenure15 — as did “rogue 
states” such as Eritrea and Sudan, mostly 
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for reasons of their geostrategic location.16
During President Rouhani’s first term 
(2013-17), Iran’s engagement in Africa 
abated. With the international nuclear deal 
in the offing, the continent’s political and 
economic importance to Iran decreased 
considerably. Iranian trade figures can be 
seen as a clear indication of this. Paradoxi-
cally, this is about the same time that Saudi 
Arabia began to rediscover its strategic 
interest in Africa after a prolonged period 
of neglect.
Saudi Arabia
The beginnings of Saudi Arabia’s Africa 
policy date back to King Faisal (1964-75), 
who is credited with having established the 
bulk of the country’s diplomatic relations 
with African states after the Six-Day War 
of 1967 in 
an effort to 
isolate Isra-
el. Faysal is 
thus deemed 
responsible 
for the first 
coherent policy toward the continent, one 
that was abandoned, however, soon after 
his death.17 This is not to say that Riyadh 
was ever completely absent from the con-
tinent thereafter. The kingdom has always 
sought to secure its vital interests in its 
immediate neighborhood, the (Greater) 
Horn of Africa — especially Somalia. In 
the latter, it backed up the United States 
in containing the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War and, later on, attempted to bring 
about agreements between warring fac-
tions in the new millennium.18
Apart from being export markets for 
crude oil and hydrocarbon products, food 
security was another reason some African 
states remained on the Saudi agenda.19 
When prices for staple foods doubled on 
the world market in 2007, the kingdom — 
via the Agricultural Development Fund 
— launched the King Abdallah Initiative 
for Saudi Agricultural Investments Abroad, 
providing subsidies to Saudi companies 
prepared to invest in foreign farmland. 
By then, Saudi agricultural investments 
had already flowed into Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, 
Tanzania and Uganda.20
Africa has been affected by Wahhabi 
proselytizing. Yet, compared to other 
regions, African states have only recently 
been at the center of Saudi attention. 
Although Riyadh has invested large sums 
in building educational infrastructure in, 
for instance, West Africa as well as in the 
training of African scholars in the king-
dom, the Saudi factor is just one among 
many respon-
sible for the 
surge in local 
jihadism.21 
Given that 
proselytization, 
as well as the 
direct support of Islamist groups abroad, is 
often seen as a major Saudi foreign-policy 
tool, such comparatively limited efforts 
suggest that Africa was far from a top 
priority for Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia rediscovered its strate-
gic interest in Africa in the wake of the 
Arab uprisings in 2011, chiefly for fear of 
Iranian encroachment into the continent. 
Even before this time, Saudi embassies in 
Africa had warned Riyadh of the increased 
proselytizing activities by local Iranian 
cultural centers and demanded their own 
government’s political responses.22 Yet it 
took some years for Riyadh to funnel com-
mensurate resources to back up its new 
strategic interest. Still, in 2013, a report 
by the General Department for African 
Notwithstanding the Turkish media’s 
proclivity to depict Erdoğan as Africa’s 
best friend, Turkey’s policy toward the 
continent is not, in fact, altruistic.
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States at the Saudi Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs lamented that Saudi embassies in 
Africa were ill-equipped to counter Iranian 
moves, let alone China’s advances toward 
Africa.23 In fact, Saudi Arabia’s new focus 
on Africa only became visible in 2015. It 
thus coincides with the coming to power of 
Mohammad bin Salman, the crown prince 
and de facto leader of the kingdom, and 
with the beginning of the war in Yemen.
The Saudi-led military campaign against 
the Houthis in Yemen, whom the kingdom 
considers to be Iranian proxies, drastically 
altered the geostrategic importance of the 
Horn of Africa in the eyes of Riyadh24 — 
and of Abu Dhabi, Riyadh’s main Gulf 
ally and crucial partner in this war. Al-
though the UAE has become one of the 
most active external players on the African 
continent in its own right,25 with major 
economic stakes there, it appears that Abu 
Dhabi has so far been closely coordinating 
its policies with Riyadh.26 Because Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE are ultimately pursu-
ing their own interests in Africa, it is fair 
to assume that conflict dynamics in the 
Middle East — and the war in Yemen in 
particular — have facilitated the building 
of common ground, especially on the Red 
Sea’s African shores. 
In the past five years, Riyadh and Abu 
Dhabi have invested great effort in upend-
ing Iran’s relations with Sudan, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia. These 
efforts had largely been successful at first, 
as most of the abovementioned states loos-
ened their ties with Tehran, making it more 
difficult, for instance, for Iranian vessels to 
navigate the Red Sea.27 Also, the UAE now 
runs military bases in Eritrea (Assab) and 
Somaliland (Berbera), while Saudi Arabia 
is about to open its first one in Djibouti.28 
Yet the conflict constellations in the Red 
Sea are complex and rapidly shift. The 
recent diplomatic tensions between Riyadh 
and Abu Dhabi on the one hand, and 
Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia on the other, 
have opened up space for their Middle 
Eastern competitors to regain influence in 
the Horn, including Turkey.29
Turkey
Turkey has been struggling to extend its 
clout in the regions adjacent to the Middle 
East for the past two decades.30 While 
its initial interest in Africa can be traced 
back to the coalition government of Prime 
Minister Bülent Ecevit (1999–2002), Turk-
ish relations with African states intensi-
fied with the coming to power of Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan — who in 2005 launched 
his country’s official “Opening to Africa” 
policy.31 Though a relative newcomer, 
Ankara would rapidly gain on Riyadh and 
Tehran — today self-confidently present-
ing in government fact sheets the fruits of 
its labors.32
The figures are certainly telling. The 
number of Turkish embassies in Africa, 
for instance, rose from 12 in 2009 to 40 
in 2018. Its bilateral trade volume with 
African countries reached $18.8 billion 
in 2017, a threefold increase since 2003. 
Turkish investments are estimated to have 
surpassed $6 billion by early 2018. The 
ruling AKP government also stresses the 
rising numbers in its official development 
assistance (ODA) to African countries 
and the fact that Erdoğan, who has visited 
23 African states some 39 times, is “the 
leader who visited Africa the most in the 
world.”33
Notwithstanding the Turkish media’s 
proclivity to depict Erdoğan as Africa’s 
best friend,34 Turkey’s policy toward the 
continent is not, in fact, altruistic. Ankara’s 
Africa policy in the new millennium has 
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been mainly motivated by the prospects 
of economic gains and political visibility 
in international affairs.35 Such strategic 
concerns seem to have become even more 
pressing in the last few years. Africa’s eco-
nomic potential surely remains a driving 
force of its Opening to Africa policy, but 
it is not the sole explanation for Ankara’s 
advances. In fact, Turkish exports to 
sub-Saharan states have been stagnating, 
whereas investments chiefly concentrate 
on North Africa. While Erdoğan’s latest 
visits to Africa36 may thus have aimed to 
stimulate the Turkish economy,37 they also 
served to strengthen political relations with 
new allies after Turkey’s falling out with 
the European Union and the escalation of 
Middle Eastern power struggles.38 In ad-
dition, the upgrading of diplomatic rela-
tions with sub-Saharan African countries 
— home to 15.5 percent of the world’s 
Muslim population39 — is also supposed to 
undergird Ankara’s claim to global Islamic 
leadership,40 something that is heavily 
contested by Riyadh.
POWER STRUGGLES ABROAD
We thus have a mixture of reasons ac-
counting for past periods of Iranian, Saudi 
and Turkish engagement with — or disen-
gagement from — Africa. Besides prosely-
tization, which has been chiefly conducted 
by Riyadh and Tehran and seems to have 
been a means rather than an end,41 African 
states have often been seen as a recruit-
ment pool for international allies. More-
over, economic motives have dominated 
the Iranian and Turkish agendas, as well as 
that of Saudi Arabia, whose exports to sub-
Saharan states by far eclipse those of Iran 
and Turkey. Yet, in view of their figures for 
sub-Saharan states as a percentage of total 
trade, it is hard to see how economic rea-
sons alone can explain the latest stepped-
up efforts. This holds especially true for 
Saudi Arabia, as its oil-based economy is 
hardly complementary with those of many 
African states, whose own companies are 
also based on natural resources — often, 
hydrocarbons.42
Arguably, it seems clear in the Saudi 
case that Riyadh’s hegemonic ambitions 
in the Middle East are the main driver 
of its current foreign policy vis-à-vis 
Africa. It is mainly bent on containing 
its regional competitors, as well as us-
ing the continent’s resources to further its 
claims to leadership in the Middle East. 
But Riyadh’s latest moves have, in turn, 
provoked strategic reactions by Ankara 
and Tehran. As a consequence, Africa is 
increasingly becoming a theater of Middle 
Eastern conflict.
Scholars of international relations have 
long ignored the meaning of regions for 
world politics; they have quite often been 
seen as just another stage for great-power 
competition. Still, there are few approach-
es accounting for the interests of systemic 
actors, including non-great powers, in a 
given region. Pursuant to one prominent 
rationale, extra-regional actors develop 
their interests in a region in accordance 
with how they strengthen their positions, 
both internationally and in their home 
region. Put differently, a region gains — or 
loses — in importance to external actors 
depending on its intrinsic, extrinsic and 
negative value.43
The Africa policy of Saudi Arabia fits 
into this logic in multiple ways. First, of-
ficial narratives regularly portray Africa 
as a region with negative value due to its 
importance to Riyadh’s adversaries. As 
noted, Africa only resurfaced on the Saudi 
agenda after Riyadh had fully realized the 
continent’s strategic meaning for Ankara 
and Tehran.44 In 2012, for instance, a 
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Saudi diplomat applauded Riyadh’s turn to 
Africa, arguing that “as a result of our big 
absence we will lose the competition with 
other states if we miss the chance to pow-
erfully penetrate Africa — which would 
only mean a natural geopolitical expansion 
to us.”45 Appraising Riyadh’s Africa policy, 
the newly appointed minister for African 
affairs, Ahmad Qattan, recently stated, “We 
are now on the right track — the more so 
as we have not adapted ourselves to the 
African continent in past decades as was 
required, providing an opportunity to oth-
ers, some of which have caused trouble.”46
Second, today more than ever, Riyadh 
considers Africa as a region of intrinsic 
value owing to its vital resources.47 Elabo-
rating on 
the reasons 
for Riyadh’s 
new com-
prehensive 
approach, 
which will be 
geared toward 
all African 
states, Qattan placed emphasis on the 
continent’s potential to enrich the Saudi 
economy.48 But Africa’s resources are 
certainly not limited in effect to economic 
gain. Riyadh relies, for instance, on Su-
danese and Somali forces in its military 
campaign in Yemen and, in concert with 
Abu Dhabi, has recently begun to negotiate 
with Kampala regarding the deployment 
of Ugandan soldiers there.49 Furthermore, 
African states are supposed to back the 
Saudi position in diplomatic disputes;50 to 
be a source of prestige by joining the ranks 
of the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance 
to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT) or attending 
the Arab Islamic American Summit during 
Donald Trump’s visit to the kingdom in 
May 2017, thereby supporting Riyadh’s 
claim to leadership in the Muslim world.51
Third, Riyadh has come to view Africa 
as a region of extrinsic value. It is consid-
ered to have auxiliary potential for the de-
fense of the homeland or for an offensive 
against competitors, including Turkey but 
most notably Iran.52 This strategic view is 
not restricted to the Red Sea region either. 
Saudi Arabia recently financially supported 
the Sahel Joint Military Force, an offshoot 
of the G5-mandated coalition to combat 
terrorism, organized crime and human traf-
ficking in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger and Chad.53 While also supported by 
the EU, Saudi backing for this G5 under-
taking is widely seen as another indica-
tion of Riyadh’s determination to combat 
Iran.54 The 
same applies, 
for instance, 
in Nigeria, 
where Riyadh 
has been try-
ing to weaken 
the Islamic 
Movement 
funded by Tehran;55 in Senegal, where 
the kingdom has increased its funding 
for mosques run by Salafis to counter the 
influence of Iranian-financed educational 
institutions;56 and in South Africa, where 
Riyadh — as in Nigeria and Senegal 
— has invested heavily in the country’s 
economy to disrupt South African-Iranian 
relations.57
Yet Riyadh’s heightened engagement is 
provoking a stepping-up of Turkish and 
Iranian activities in return. The opening 
of a Turkish military base in Somalia, as 
well as Ankara’s leasing of Sudan’s Suakin 
Island in the Red Sea in late 2017, may, 
for instance, be interpreted as a response 
to Saudi and Emirati moves.58 These steps, 
however, are considered to further com-
In May 2017, Foreign Minister Javad 
Zarif announced that, apart from 
safeguarding its economic and political 
interests, Tehran was determined also to 
establish stability and security in Africa.
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promise Arab security interests in what has 
been labeled “the Arabian lake” by some 
commentators.59 This is even more so the 
case as Ankara has begun to coordinate its 
policies in the Red Sea with Qatar, still un-
der the economic and political boycott by 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain 
that began with the Gulf diplomatic row of 
2017.
Iran, too, has again boosted its activi-
ties in Africa during Rouhani’s second 
term (2017–present).60 Shortly after his 
reelection in May 2017, Foreign Minister 
Javad Zarif announced that, apart from 
safeguarding its cultural, economic and 
political interests, Tehran was determined 
also to establish stability and security in 
Africa.61 This can be read as a clear refer-
ence to recent Saudi engagement there. In 
any case, the number of high-level Iranian 
officials visiting African states, including 
Rouhani himself, has increased notably 
ever since. Iran’s refocusing on Africa has 
been further spurred by the de facto ter-
mination of the nuclear deal by the Trump 
administration and Tehran’s subsequent 
need to restrengthen its economy. Given 
these two developments, Africa’s strategic 
meaning to Tehran has become of “para-
mount significance,” according to Zarif.62
OUTLOOK
The rapid deepening of transregional 
relations can be seen as a mixed blessing 
for Africa. The 2018 hallmark agreement 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, fostered by 
the prospect of massive investments from 
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, illustrates the 
roles that Middle Eastern states can play 
in promoting peace — and, potentially, 
in spurring regional integration on their 
neighboring continent. That said, as long 
as it is geopolitical competition that dic-
tates the agenda of Middle Eastern powers, 
the chances for genuine African peace and 
security look slim.
This reality has already arisen in a num-
ber of instances, in fact. On the Djibouti-
Eritrea border, Riyadh’s diplomatic row 
with Qatar threatened to revive the armed 
conflict between Asmara and Djibouti, 
when in 2017 Qatari peacekeepers pulled 
out of the buffer zone without notice after 
both countries sided with Riyadh.63 In So-
malia, the Middle Eastern regional powers’ 
competition for influence further unsettles 
the integrity of the federal state, increas-
ing the likelihood of resurgent large-scale 
conflict.64 In Nigeria, the Saudi-Iranian 
conflict has contributed to a fueling of 
violent clashes between the Saudi-backed 
Izala movement and the Iranian-backed 
Islamic Movement.65
These and other incidents have justifi-
ably raised fears that Africa is about to 
become a new theater for Middle Eastern 
conflicts,66 and the latest developments 
do indeed suggest that gaining influence 
at each other’s expense is the primary 
objective for Ankara, Riyadh and Tehran 
alike. Take, for instance, the Saudi-led 
initiative to establish the Council of Arab 
and African States Bordering the Red Sea 
and the Gulf of Aden. First discussed by 
representatives of Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Jordan, Somalia, Sudan and Ye-
men during meetings in Cairo and Riyadh 
in 2017 and 2018, the entity was founded 
in January 2020 and announced as a way 
to foster cooperation among its members 
and to enhance security, stability, trade 
and investment in the region.67 In Decem-
ber 2018, when the formal creation of the 
Council was still in limbo,68 then-Saudi 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Adel Al-Jubeir 
stressed that it was “part of the Kingdom’s 
efforts to protect its interests” — aiming 
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to lessen “outside influence … on this 
region.”69 That “outside influence” meant 
Iran and Turkey was duly understood by 
media outlets in the Arab Gulf states, as 
well in Iran and Turkey themselves.70
Despite official avowals in Ankara, 
Riyadh and Tehran of Africa’s strategic 
meaning, it is unclear how the Middle 
Eastern competition unfolding there will 
actually shape up in the near future, be-
ing heavily contingent on developments 
beyond African shores. Compared to past 
periods, Iran’s reach in Africa is currently 
limited due to both Tehran’s deliberate 
intermittent neglect of the continent dur-
ing Rouhani’s first term and successful 
Saudi and Emirati containment efforts. 
The Trump administration’s pullout from 
the nuclear deal and the latest heightened 
saber-rattling between Washington and 
Tehran have underlined Africa’s impor-
tance to Iran and, with economic sanctions 
again in place, seriously complicated its 
Africa policy. In a way, the same holds 
true for Ankara, which is currently facing a 
massive budget deficit as a consequence of 
Turkey’s severe economic decline. While 
Iran’s foreign-policy apparatus has be-
come accustomed to working with limited 
resources over the past few decades, it 
remains to be seen how Turkey’s foreign 
policy will adapt to its own financial 
restrictions. Notwithstanding its alliance 
with Qatar, which might be willing to 
cover some of Ankara’s expenses in one 
way or another, Turkey’s Africa policy can 
be expected to lose impetus sooner rather 
than later.
All this seems to play into the hands of 
Riyadh, which is far from facing com-
parable constraints in its African affairs 
and which has a potent ally at hand, both 
in terms of resources and strategic plan-
ning. For the time being, Abu Dhabi and 
Riyadh have a number of strategic goals in 
common. Above all, they share a marked 
enmity toward Iran, Turkey and Qatar. Yet 
whether or not this will make for a stable 
partnership and contribute to a sustainable, 
coordinated Africa policy is questionable. 
Regardless of the unsteady nature of per-
sonalistic foreign-policy decision making, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have strategic 
differences with regard to the war in Ye-
men — and, even more acutely, the future 
of that country.71 Although the war itself is 
unlikely to end anytime soon, the future of 
a coordinated Saudi-Emirati Africa policy 
in many respects hinges on the extent to 
which Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will be able 
to settle their differences on the Arab side 
of the Bab al-Mandab strait. This bears 
some irony, but it is also logically coher-
ent. It was the Yemen war that gave rise 
to heightened Saudi-Emirati coordination 
efforts in Africa in the first place. Yet, how-
ever unlikely, as of now, any ruptures in 
Saudi-Emirati relations — let alone serious 
ones — would undoubtedly unleash new 
dynamics in the power struggle for Africa.
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